This is a response to the Blog titled “The Economics of Bribe” found in http://abigyawn.blogspot.com/ . The Author mentioned that a Law Enforcers slary should be a function of the variable x plus a Constant C.
Or f(y) = fx + C
Where y= the law enforcers Salary
x= the incentive/bribe derived from catching a lawbreaker
C= Constant, or the basic salary he receives from the government irrespective of number of law breakers
The value of f(x) if touches or exceeds X (value paid by the law breaker to the govt for breaking law) the cop makes nothing because the entire money goes to the govt. In this model, the only economic incentive the cop will derive is to charge a bribe an amt that the law breaker will be happy to pay and buy his pardon. So the traffic condition is not improved. Law breakers keep breaking, Cops are happy (thanks to the lack of economic incentive to catch law breakers).
So how can the government throw some incentive for the cops to catch the law breakers who break traffic laws? Lets assume that the cost of breaking the law is Rs. 2000(X) and a challan is issued. A cop takes a bribe of Rs. 100. This is 5% of Rs. 2000.
The variable component for a cop would then be:
5/100(X)
So the entire salary be
f(y) = m[5/100(X)] + C
Where m = number of law breakers caught.
Now who pays for the percentage incentive? The law breakers themselves.
The revised challan would be X’= 1.05 (X) taking the 5% incentive.
But this model has a flaw too. The cops would only like to work in areas where lawbreakers travel, such as locations near Campuses (students w/o liscences) crowded crossings etc, where the probability of m will increase. In othetwise peaceful places they will be less motivated to work.
So lets add another variable h. h = hours. The new model
F(x) = m[5/100(X)] + g[5/100(X)] + C
Value of g can be calculated from the number of challan issued and average 5 mins / clallan. Minus this from the total duty hours.
If m rises g falls.
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7 comments:
duuuuuuuuuuuuuuude! ur wayyyyyyy too hi-fi man! ur fundas were tanP. hehe. F(x) = m[5/100(X)] + g[5/100(X)] + C..??? jeeez! but i cud mk some sense out of why cops wud wanna go 2 "areas where lawbreakers travel". interesting.
you are right, and i must have added the cost of shirking must also be made high.. that happens automaticaly when your salary increases
earlier the cop was getting say 2000 rs Plus bribe as a salary.. he could have gone to the job market and easily found a job paying him 5 k but because of other facilaties of a cop and the bribe he thought he will carry on as a cop
so tomorrow if he is chucked out he still can go to the job market and get a 5k job..
now if his salary suddenly increase to 7k , thanks to the incentives... then he will not shirk.. as his cost of shirking has suddenly increased.. and cant go to the labour market and get a 7 k job plus the the other facilities of a cop??
so now he has reasons no to take bribe and safe gaurd his job
Also I assume Citiris Paribus
Well Yes my friend there is also a risk that a cop may start pulling non-law breakers...Lets assume money is an icentive to have a clear conscience.
Thats why i have assumed Citiris Paribus or keeping all other things equal hence conscience does not change..
we have to assume that or else the the non linear euation will not be derived hahah
Smart thinking man!
i dont think all this will work in india. the human intervention in such cases in india will always lead to bribes. i suggest let traffic police remain in the less congested areas and control traffic in the more congested ones. all offenses like jumping the lights or illegal parking will be video recorded and not acted upon immediately. people will check the videos and send challans directly to the address the car is registered to. think about it, you cant bribe a postman for a driving offense! nor can you bribe a camcorder. to reduce bribes, remove bribe takers!
for offenses like drunk driving or driving without proper papers, it is really a chance the cops take by stopping people at random. and often in cases it turns out the offenders are caught due to traffic violation and then found to not have a license as well etc. while the second case can be easily handled electronically, start thinking about the first random case. see if you can come up with a logic
Nice Logic sir.
Many reasons: No Helmet, Stopping on Zebra crossing(even the most experienced drivers do that)etc.
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